The fundamental objective of building the European Union was to create a single market in the European region. Maintaining the „common sense“ of the EU market is extremely important. The EU has implemented competition law that applies to companies operating in the EU market. Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE) deal mainly with competition law and, in addition, some other laws, regulations and directives regulate the „fair competition“ of the internal market. The European Union`s competition law with regard to agreements to limit competition and its effectiveness, as well as judicial precedents, will be the subject of this dissertation. Some types of agreements are, by their very nature, considered restrictive. As the Commission has indicated in its guideline, experience shows that these agreements are likely to have a negative effect on competition, so they are automatically seen as limiting competition. Such agreements are classified as object chords (they are intended) and therefore there is no need to analyze the actual effect. On the basis of the ECJ`s new doctrine on useful concerted practices, provided for in Article 101, the question is whether information is exchanged by competitors, thereby reducing market uncertainty. This doctrine opens the door to companies that violate Article 101, simply because a competitor unilaterally decides to pass on information to companies. It doesn`t matter if the other company uses the information.
It doesn`t matter if the other company refuses to disclose information. As long as a competitor shares information and anyone who receives this information remains on the market, there is a violation of Article 101 for all those who attended the meeting. As a result, the Court of Justice has made it very easy for the European Commission and national competition authorities to prove violations of Article 101 or national competition law, which is comparable to Article 101. Under T-Mobile, competitors are not allowed to disclose information to competitors and, when essential information is actually disclosed, companies will have engaged in concerted behaviour that, by its objective, would limit competition if they remain in the market, even if the company is in the process of having the information and does not communicate to its competitor. On the one hand, such a requirement has therefore led to uncertainty because it blurs the distinction between object agreements and action agreements. Unlike the traditional formalist approach, companies may not be sure that their agreement would be contrary to Article 101, paragraph 1. While it is clear that the objective purpose of its agreement was anti-competitive, it could in principle be saved. Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TEFU) is one of the most important articles on competition law in the European Union.  It prohibits any agreement, concerted practice or decision by companies that „have the purpose or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition in the internal market“.  A concerted agreement or practice may be contrary to Article 101, former Article 85 and Article 81 of the Treaty on the European Economic Community, when they affect or affect competition in the internal market.  The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has ruled that the purpose and effect are two different categories of offences within the meaning of Article 101.  Therefore, where there is an object of contention, there is no need to consider the effects of the action on the market.
 Article 101, paragraph 1, of the EUTS prohibits agreements between companies „with the purpose or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition“. It is important to note that the words „object or effect“ must be interpreted in a disjuntive manner.